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Restoring Chevron’s Domain
Jonathan H. Adler*

For some three decades, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1 has stood at the center of administrative law.2 Although
Chevron may have been somewhat “accidental,”3 Chevron has been among
the most important and consequential administrative law decisions of all
time.4 It is, according to Cass Sunstein, a “foundational, even a quasiconstitutional text” in administrative law.5
Foundational or not, Chevron’s domain6 is under siege.7 In recent years,
commentators have raised doubts about the doctrine’s continued vitality8 and

*
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is based upon remarks delivered at the 2016 Missouri Law Review Symposium, A
Future Without the Administrative State?, which occurred on March 3, 2016. The
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the fault of the author.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006) (identifying Chevron as the most cited “modern public law” decision).
3. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental
Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399, 399 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
See also infra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
4. See Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1867, 1872 (2015) (noting Chevron is “the Supreme Court’s most important
decision regarding judicial deference to agency views of statutory meaning”).
5. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006).
6. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833 (2001).
7. See Catherine M. Sharkey, In the Wake of Chevron’s Retreat 5 (2016) (unpublished
manuscript),
http://administrativestate.gmu.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Sharkey_In-the-Wake-of-Chevron_5_20_16.pdf (“King v.
Burwell and Michigan v. EPA – decided within the same momentous week in June
2015 – taken together, seem to augur the Supreme Court’s retreat from the venerable
Chevron.”).
8. See, e.g., Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2007) (reporting on Chevron’s demise); see
also Herz, supra note 4, at 1868 (observing that three decisions during the Supreme
Court’s 2014–15 Term “suggested that Chevron’s condition was, if not terminal, at
least serious”); Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding
Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 65
(2015) (noting a recent “series of opinions . . . that call Chevron’s future into question”).
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ultimate desirability.9 Indeed, some have suggested Chevron should be
ditched altogether10 – if not by the courts, then perhaps by Congress.11
This brief Article’s aim is not so ambitious as to praise or bury Chevron.
It seeks only to make a more modest point about the Chevron doctrine and its
domain.12 On the assumption that Chevron, in some form, will remain a significant part of the constellation of administrative law, this Article suggests
Chevron’s domain should be defined and delimited by its doctrinal grounding. Put another way, the legal rationale for providing deference to agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutory text should determine the doctrine’s

9. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“‘[T]he judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.’. . . Chevron deference precludes judges from exercising that judgment . . . . It thus wrests from Courts
the ultimate interpretative authority to ‘say what the law is . . . .’” (alterations in original) (first quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring); then quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)));
Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673,
708 (2007) (“That inquiry into the reasonableness of the agency’s ‘interpretation of
the statute’ is not an adequate substitute for the arbitrary and capricious review that
the APA requires.”); Patrick J. Smith, Chevron’s Conflict with the Administrative
Procedure Act, 32 VA. TAX REV. 813, 814 (2013) (“Chevron also ignored the provision in section 706 of the APA requiring that, when a court reviews agency action,
‘the reviewing court shall . . . interpret . . . statutory provisions.’”) (alterations in original). Some raised concerns about Chevron earlier. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism
and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 353–54 (1994) (“A
less . . . fundamental problem is that Chevron is based on a model of courts as faithful
agents – faithful agents first of the legislature, but when no instructions from the legislature can be discerned, then faithful agents of administrative decisionmakers.”).
10. See Jack M. Beerman, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779,
850–51 (2010) (“Chevron is inconsistent with the APA, has not accomplished its
apparent goals of simplifying judicial review and increasing deference to agencies,
and has instead spawned an incredibly complicated regime that serves only to waste
litigant and judicial resources.”); Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1187, 1227–37 (2016) (raising constitutional concerns about Chevron deference); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
11. See Separation of Powers Restoration Act, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016)
(this legislation would, among other things, overturn the Chevron doctrine). For a
discussion of this legislation, see Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016:
Hearing on H.R. 4768 Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and
Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016); Christopher J.
Walker, Opinion, Courts Regulating the Regulators, U. PENN. L. SCH.: REGBLOG
(Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.regblog.org/2016/04/25/walker-courts-regulating-theregulators/.
12. On the notion of Chevron’s domain generally, see Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 6.
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scope and application.13 More precisely, insofar as the Court’s subsequent
application and elucidation of Chevron have indicated that Chevron deference
is predicated on a theory of delegation, courts should only provide such deference when the relevant power has been delegated by Congress (even if such
delegation is only implicit). Correspondingly, such deference should be
withheld when such delegation is absent or cannot be presumed to have occurred. Chevron should only prevail when confined to its proper domain, and
its domain is a product of delegation.

I. THE ACCIDENTAL LANDMARK
Chevron’s two-part test is quite familiar:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.14

This test has become a fixture of administrative law. Whether or not the
Court’s description describes what lower courts actually do in practice,15
lower courts rely upon Chevron quite often.16 Each year federal appellate
courts cite Chevron in over 200 cases.17 But although Chevron is ubiquitous,
its place in the pantheon of great administrative law cases requires some ex-

13. See id. at 836 (“The conclusion that Chevron rests on an implied delegation
from Congress . . . has important implications for Chevron’s domain . . . .”).
14. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984) (footnotes omitted).
15. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only
One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009) (arguing a Chevron analysis only requires one
step).
16. See Kent H. Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts,
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2017),
115
MICH.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2808848.
17. Westlaw indicates that, between 2011 and 2015, Chevron has been cited by
federal appellate courts approximately 230 times per year. Citing References for
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
WESTLAW, www.next.westlaw.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2016).
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planation. When it was first decided, few recognized its significance.18 The
Justices seemed unaware they were erecting a substantial edifice.19 There is
no indication that Chevron’s author, Justice John Paul Stevens, sought to
break new ground, let alone define the contours of judicial review of administrative agency statutory interpretations for years to come.
Chevron’s significance grew over time as judges on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the Executive Branch deployed Chevron’s
famous test to blunt judicial review and carve out greater freedom for administrative action.20 The Reagan and Bush Administrations, in particular, saw
Chevron as a way to facilitate greater executive control over regulatory policy.21
Justice Stevens’s ambitions while drafting Chevron may have been
modest, but the effects of his decision have been quite expansive. Given the
breadth of delegation in the modern administrative state, granting deference
to agency interpretations of the statutes they implement augments the scope
of agency power. Congress enacts lengthy statutes laden with gaps and ambiguities conferring broad regulatory authority to federal agencies, which, in
turn, are granted the responsibility and authority to offer conclusive interpretations of what these statutes mean.22 Although courts are not supposed to
consider agency views in the threshold inquiry,23 this is a limitation honored
in the breach.24
18. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 402 (“But Chevron was little noticed when it
was decided, and came to be regarded as a landmark case only some years later.”).
19. See id. at 417; see also Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Blackmun Papers, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10637, 10644
(2005).
20. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 422.
21. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1087 (2008) (“Almost immediately, Reagan Administration officials and appointees proclaimed a ‘Chevron Revolution.’”); Merrill, supra
note 3, at 424 (“The Democratic judges were likely somewhat hostile to the deregulatory initiatives of the Reagan Administration, and would seek some way to strike
them down. . . . The newly-appointed Republican judges, in contrast . . . would be
eager to find some way to uphold these initiatives. Perhaps these Republican judges
seized upon Chevron as the most effective weapon at hand for upholding controversial administrative decisions.”); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2372–80 (2001) (discussing how Chevron can and should
facilitate greater White House control of agencies).
22. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41472, RULEMAKING
REQUIREMENTS AND AUTHORITIES IN THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 4 (2010) (“CRS searches of the Dodd-Frank Act identified a total of 330 provisions that expressly indicated in the text that rulemaking is
required or permitted. For a variety of reasons, however, the number of final rules
that will be ultimately issued pursuant to the act is unknowable.”).
23. See Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The first
question, whether there is such an ambiguity, is for the court, and we owe the agency
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In offering their interpretations, agencies not only resolve ambiguities,
they exercise policy judgment about how regulatory regimes should be implemented and enforced. This means, in practice, Chevron deference does
not merely concern the semantic meaning of statutes. It extends to policy
choice as well.25 If agency interpretations of ambiguous or incomplete statutory texts are to be given conclusive effect, as Chevron seems to require, federal agencies have more room to direct federal regulatory policy.

II. GROUNDING CHEVRON
Whether due to its accidental provenance or not, Chevron was not particularly well grounded at its inception. The opinion itself was conceived as
an application of well-settled practice26 and offered multiple potential explanations for conferring deference to agency interpretations. Accordingly, there
has been much debate about how to understand Chevron’s rationale.27
One justification for giving deference to agency interpretations of statutes they implement is comparative institutional competence.28 Agencies, as
institutions, may possess a comparative advantage at interpreting the meaning
of statutory provisions they implement. Agency officials are likely to be far
more familiar with the particulars of a given statutory regime, the subjects to
which the statute applies, and how different interpretations or applications
may advance (or frustrate) the legislature’s purposes than are judges (or even
no deference on the existence of ambiguity.”); see also Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v.
Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc), amended, 38 F.3d
1224 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct 1863, 1877
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“An agency cannot exercise interpretive authority
until it has it; . . . whether an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court,
without deference to the agency.”).
24. If agency expertise is a justification for Chevron deference, and, as Christopher Walker has demonstrated, agencies participate in legislative drafting, see Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1037
(2015) (“[N]early eight in ten [federal agencies] (78%) indicated that their agency
always or often participates in a technical drafting role for the statutes it administers .
. . .”), some suggest courts should consider agency views when determining whether a
statute is ambiguous. Sharkey, supra note 7, at 29–31 (discussing implications of
agency participation in legislative drafting).
25. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845
(1984) (“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies
that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not
one that Congress would have sanctioned.” (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367
U.S. 374, 382–83 (1961))).
26. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 512–13 (noting that “courts have been content to accept
‘reasonable’ executive interpretations of law for some time”).
27. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 21, at 1088.
28. Id. at 1147.
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legislators). Indeed, agency officials may be responsible for portions of the
relevant statutory text.29
Another justification is political accountability.30 Agency officials are
subject to presidential appointment and (at least outside of independent agencies) presidential removal as well.31 The most significant and substantial
agency actions, such as the promulgation of economically significant regulations, are subject to White House review through the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs.32 Insofar as adopting a particular statutory interpretation entails some degree of policy judgment, agency officials are likely to
adopt those statutory interpretations that are consistent with the reigning administration’s policy preferences.
Agencies are not only more accountable than judges, they may also have
a greater understanding of legislative intent and purposes. Agency officials
may have played a role in the drafting process. At the same time, they are
likely to be cognizant of legislative preferences when implementing and interpreting statutory provisions. When agencies go astray, members of Congress may intervene. Legislative oversight and control over the appropriations process discipline agency action, at least on the margin.
The combination of executive and legislative pressures ensures that
agency interpretations will be responsive to political concerns. Judges, on the
other hand, are more insulated from such political pressures. This, combined
with the relative lack of expertise among the judiciary, means that judicial
interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, while perhaps more semantically satisfying, will be less responsive to political forces, and the judges
themselves will be largely unaccountable for their decisions.

29. See Walker, supra note 24, at 1037 (“[N]early four in five rule drafters reported that their agencies always or often participate in a technical drafting role of
statutes they administer, whereas three in five indicated that their agencies similarly
participate in a policy or substantive drafting role.”).
30. Id. at 1064. See also Yehonatan Givati & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial
Deference to Inconsistent Agency Statutory Interpretations, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 91
(2011) (“Many of these scholars conclude that the need for agencies to respond flexibly to changing circumstances militates in favor of deferring just as much to revised
agency interpretations as to initial agency interpretations . . . . A powerful additional
argument for this position invokes the importance of political accountability: changes
in an agency’s interpretive position may reflect changes in the agency’s political priorities – often triggered by a change in the presidential administration . . . .”).
31. See Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2544 (2011) (under the
reasoning of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 561
U.S. 477 (2010), “agency independence is unconstitutional because it insulates the
heads of independent agencies from the President’s removal power and consequently
contravenes the constitutional structure that vests the executive power and accountability for the executive branch in the President”).
32. See Christopher C. Demuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1075–76 (1986).
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Empowering agencies to offer authoritative interpretations of ambiguous
federal laws also serves the goal of uniformity within the federal system.33 If
federal law is federal law, it should apply uniformly throughout the nation.
Leaving the interpretation of ambiguous or unclear statutes to the courts can
result in different interpretations applying in different places (at least until the
Supreme Court resolves such questions, should it choose to do so). A federal
agency interpretation to which courts are obliged to defer, on the other hand,
provides for a single nationwide interpretation of the relevant statute.
Expertise, accountability, and uniformity are all policy reasons for deferring to agencies over judges in the interpretation of ambiguous statutory
phrases. They are reasons why Congress might prefer to confer interpretive
authority to agencies over courts. Legislators may also conclude that agencies are more faithful (or more controllable) agents than courts. But whatever
the merits of such arguments, they do not provide a legal basis for Chevron.
The above are reasons why Congress might choose to enact a deference
regime, but they are not evidence that Congress has actually done so. Indeed,
there is little evidence that Congress has adopted such a generalized presumption that agencies are due deference in their interpretations.34 To the contrary,
the plain text of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) would seem to
suggest just the opposite. Section 706 of the APA provides that courts are to
“decide all relevant questions of law,” including the meaning of “statutory
provisions.”35 This would seem to preclude a blanket doctrine of ceding interpretive primacy to administrative agencies. After all, the semantic mean33. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 6, at 861 (“[I]f we insist that courts always have the final say about the meaning of federal statutes, the increasingly common result will be that federal law will come to mean different things in different
circuits. Other than the Supreme Court, the only entities with the power to adopt
nationally uniform interpretations are the federal administrative agencies. Consequently, if uniformity cannot be achieved by pushing interpretational conflicts up to
the Supreme Court, it may be necessary to resolve these conflicts by pushing them
down to the agency level.”); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year:
Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1987) (“When national uniformity in
the administration of national statutes is called for, the national agencies responsible
for that administration can be expected to reach single readings of the statutes for
which they are responsible and to enforce those readings within their own framework.”).
34. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from
the Inside – An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 995–96 (2013) (reporting legislative drafters surveyed “realize[d] that courts use ambiguity as a signal of delegation” but this “does
not mean that they intend to delegate whenever ambiguity remains in finalized statutory language”).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the
terms of an agency action.”).
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ing of a given statutory provision is precisely the sort of legal question the
APA assigns to the courts.
Although others have suggested that Chevron has a constitutional36 or
common law37 foundation, the Court has made clear that Chevron is, in fact,
premised on a delegation of interpretive and policymaking authority from
Congress to implementing agencies.38 There is no statutory provision, in the
APA or elsewhere, instructing courts to defer to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutory texts. Nonetheless, Chevron deference rests on a presumption that such delegation has in fact occurred.39 As Chief Justice Roberts explained in King v. Burwell, Chevron “is premised on the theory that a
statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the
agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”40
The delegation foundation of Chevron does have constitutional roots. It
is a function of the initial and exclusive allocation of legislative authority to
the Congress in Article I.41 As a consequence, administrative agencies have
no inherent power.42 Federal agencies only have that authority and power
that Congress delegates to them.43 A federal agency’s power to interpret statutory language – and, in the process, to define the contours of legal rights and
36. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and
the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 286 (1988) (“[T]he
importance of judicial deference to administrative action is derived from the separation of powers. Recognizing this cannot truly be said to slight the appropriate role of
the court to ‘say what the law is.’”); see also Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the
Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 283 (1986).
37. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593,
618–19 (1992); David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 345–54 (2000).
38. See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) (“A precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative
authority.”).
39. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 6, at 836 (“Chevron rests on implied
congressional intent.”); id. at 855 (“A finding that there has been an appropriate congressional delegation of power to the agency is critical under Chevron.”).
40. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000), superseded by statute,
Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 387–387u (West
2016)); see also Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016)
(“A premise of Chevron is that when Congress grants an agency the authority to administer a statute by issuing regulations with the force of law, it presumes the agency
will use that authority to resolve ambiguities in the statutory scheme.”).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States . . . .”).
42. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is
axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations
is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”).
43. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency
literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”).
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obligations under federal law – only extends as far as it has been delegated by
the legislature in a validly enacted statute.44 If an agency is to exercise interpretive authority and control how a federal law is to be interpreted and applied in federal court, that power must come from Congress. The policy
judgment that certain policy questions may be resolved by administrative
action is for Congress to make.
Although Congress must delegate interpretive authority to agencies, few
statutes expressly provide for such delegation. That Congress intends each
ambiguity as a delegation of authority may be a “legal fiction.”45 There is
evidence that legislative staff are aware of Chevron and consider its application when drafting legislative language.46 Nonetheless, there is good reason
to doubt that members of Congress have the specific intent to delegate conclusive interpretive authority to federal agencies in each and every legislative
enactment that does not specify otherwise.47 Indeed, legislative drafters may
not even be aware of the latent ambiguities that reside in their handiwork.
Regardless, this legal fiction provides Chevron’s legal foundation.
Subsequent Court opinions have made clear that Chevron’s foundation
rests on a theory of delegation.48 Mead, in particular, adopts a delegation
theory of Chevron deference.49 Since the passing of Mead’s lone dissenter,
nothing has changed.50 Once again, the delegation theory of Chevron was
reaffirmed at the close of the last Term in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, in which the Court unanimously reaffirmed the need for agencies to explain the basis for their statutory interpretations.51

44. Id. at 358.
45. See Herz, supra note 4, at 1876 (“[I]t is hard to find anyone who does not

consider congressional delegation a fiction.”); Lisa Schulz Bressman, Reclaiming the
Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2009 (2011) (noting
Chevron “rests on a legal fiction”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?:
Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 749 (2002) (“Chevron deference revolves around the fiction of a
congressional delegation . . . .”).
46. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 34, at 901.
47. Krotoszynski, supra note 45, at 742.
48. See Gluck, supra note 8, at 94–96.
49. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). As Eskridge
and Baer observe, “Mead appears to have partially settled the debate within the Court
about the conditions for triggering Chevron deference.” Eskridge & Baer, supra note
21, at 1123.
50. Justice Scalia was the sole dissenter in Mead. See Mead, 533 U.S at 239
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (“Chevron deference is not warranted where
the regulation is ‘procedurally defective’ – that is, where the agency errs by failing to
follow the correct procedures in issuing the regulation.” (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at
227)). Although Justice Thomas and Justice Alito dissented, they agreed with the
majority on this point. See id. at 2129 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the
majority’s conclusion that we owe no Chevron deference to the Department’s position
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The Court’s holding that Chevron deference requires legislative delegation of the authority to make a conclusive policy judgment and that an agency
must have arrived at its statutory interpretation in the course of exercising
such power are necessary corollaries of a delegation theory of Chevron.52
While the Supreme Court has grounded Chevron deference in a theory of
delegation, it has inconsistently embraced the consequences of such a conception of Chevron in subsequent cases.53

III. CONSEQUENCES
The theoretical grounding of a doctrine should shape how that doctrine
is applied. Chevron’s foundation, therefore, should define and delimit Chevron’s domain. If Chevron, properly understood, is grounded in the legislature’s delegation of authority to administrative agencies, several things
should follow. Among them are the following.
First, ambiguity is not enough to trigger Chevron deference. As Mead
indicated, ambiguous statutory language is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for Chevron deference.54 More is required.55 Specifically, there
must be an indication that Congress has delegated an agency the authority to
act with the force of law, such as through a notice-and-comment rulemaking,
and the agency must have exercised such power when putting forth its interpretation.56 This means not only that the agency must have exercised its delegated power to promulgate rules or otherwise act with the force of law, but
that it also fulfilled all of the relevant procedural requirements.57

because ‘deference is not warranted where [a] regulation is “procedurally defective.”’” (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 2125 (majority opinion)).
52. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27 (“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority.”).
53. See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (discussing City of Arlington
v. FCC, 133 S. Ct 1863, 1877 (2013)).
54. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
55. See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he
existence of statutory ambiguity is sometimes not enough to warrant the conclusion
that Congress has left a deference-warranting gap for the agency to fill because our
cases make clear that other, sometimes context-specific, factors will on occasion
prove relevant.”).
56. Mead, 533 U.S. at 240 (“We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage
in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for
which deference is claimed.”).
57. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016).
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Under Mead, Chevron’s two steps should be preceded by a robust “Step
Zero.”58 If delegation is the source of an agency’s power to resolve statutory
ambiguities, then such a delegation of authority must be found before deference is given.59 An agency interpretation is only eligible for deference if it is
adopted pursuant to an exercise of delegated power.60 Further, contrary to the
Court’s opinion in City of Arlington v. FCC, an agency should not – indeed,
cannot – receive deference on the question of whether such power has been
delegated.61 Put another way, there should be no deference on matters concerning the existence or scope of an agency’s regulatory jurisdiction.62
To say that a finding of delegation is a necessary predicate for deference
does not necessarily mean that any and all such delegations must be explicit.
Congress drafts statutes with an awareness of Chevron deference but rarely
makes explicit in statutory provisions its intent to defer.63 As Mead indicates,
the delegation of authority may be implicit in a given regulatory or administrative scheme.64 Nonetheless, this delegation must be shown. Just as Congress cannot be presumed to “hide elephants in mouseholes,”65 delegation
must be demonstrated, not merely presumed.
Where it is unlikely or implausible that Congress would have delegated
interpretive authority to an administrative agency, there should be no Chevron deference. As the Court has said in various cases – most recently King v.
Burwell – courts should be reluctant to defer to agencies on questions of major economic or political significance.66 It is extremely unlikely that Congress would delegate the responsibility for resolving such questions to admin-

58. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 208 (“If the underlying theory involves implicit (and fictional) delegation, the real question is when Congress should be understood
to have delegated law-interpreting power to an agency.”). While “Step Zero” questions are analytically prior to the traditional two-step Chevron inquiry, courts need not
always proceed through these steps in a chronological sequence. If the relevant statutory text is sufficiently clear, a reviewing court may not need to consider more.
59. As the Chief Justice argued in his City of Arlington dissent, that Congress
delegated some authority to an agency is insufficient. See 133 S. Ct. at 1881 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). What is required is that Congress delegated authority pursuant
to the statutory provisions at hand. Id.
60. See Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
1497, 1532–54 (“[T]he no-deference rule is implied by the very nature of administrative agencies – agencies have no inherent powers, and can act only to the extent that
Congress has delegated them the power to do so.”).
61. Id. at 1532.
62. Id.
63. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 34, at 996.
64. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
65. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
66. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015).
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istrative agencies.67 Indeed, the delegation of some such questions might
raise constitutional questions.68
A delegation theory of Chevron may also preclude deference concerning
certain types of questions. It is one thing to presume that Congress has delegated to an agency interpretive authority to resolve a specific ambiguity within a statutory provision that the agency administers. It is something else to
defer to an agency when the relevant question is whether a statutory delegation has occurred at all. As Chief Justice Roberts counseled in City of Arlington:
A court should not defer to an agency until the court decides, on its
own, that the agency is entitled to deference. Courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of law when and because Congress has conferred
on the agency interpretive authority over the question at issue. An
agency cannot exercise interpretive authority until it has it; the question whether an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a
court, without deference to the agency.69

The Chief Justice wrote these words in dissent, but it is not difficult to
hear their echo in his opinion for the Court in King v. Burwell. A majority of
his colleagues may have been unwilling to conclude Chevron does not apply
to agency interpretations concerning the scope of its own jurisdiction, but a
majority signed on when he revived the major questions doctrine in King.70

IV. BEYOND MAJOR QUESTIONS
The major questions doctrine is consistent with Chevron, as currently
conceived, because courts may presume it is unlikely that Congress would
delegate such matters to regulatory agencies without having made such an
intention explicit. As the Court has said on repeated occasions, it does not

67. Id. at 2489 (availability of tax credits on exchanges established by the federal
government is “a question of deep economic and political significance that is central
to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it
surely would have done so expressly”).
68. See Sales & Adler, supra note 60, at 1539.
69. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
70. See King, 135 S. Ct. 2480; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As Abbe Gluck notes, the King decision suggests that “not
every ambiguity in an imperfect and complicated statute creates interpretive space for
the agency.” See Gluck, supra note 8, at 96. Rather, Chevron applies “only for mundane or confined questions that do not implicate the functionality of the overall statutory structure.” Id. Of note, however, Justice Kennedy was the only Justice to join
Chief Justice Roberts in both opinions.
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lightly presume that Congress has hidden an elephant in a mousehole.71 This
principle is not limited to questions of major political or economic significance, however.72 The magnitude or consequence of a given policy question
may be such that courts should pause before presuming Congress has delegated the question to the agency, but this is not the only reason for courts to
pause before presuming such a delegation of authority.
In some cases, the nature of a statute’s enactment may serve the same
function as a question of major economic or political significance. Consider
King v. Burwell. As has been extensively documented, the Affordable Care
Act (“ACA”) went through a highly unusual legislative process.73 As the
Chief Justice noted in his King opinion, the statute was anything but a model
of careful draftsmanship.74 The use of the reconciliation process to enact a
statute of this size and scope was unprecedented, and the statute was never
subject to a House-Senate conference in which the kinks could have been
ironed out.75 Nor was there a conference report or other document detailing
the role and operation of each relevant provision.
In King, the Court suggested that the question of whether tax credits
were available in states with federally established exchanges was too consequential to leave to the IRS.76 Although unstated, the process through which
the ACA was enacted could reinforce this conclusion. Had Congress enacted
the ACA in a more regular and considered fashion – and not revised and enacted in a rush – it might have been reasonable for the Court to conclude that
Congress had delegated resolution of this question to the IRS, even though
such a delegation would have left the IRS with the awesome power to deter-

71. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 645
(2010).
72. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2483.
73. See Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA, 23 HEALTH
MATRIX 119, 124–26 (2013); Gluck, supra note 8, at 76–77; Jonathan H. Adler &
Michael F. Cannon, King v. Burwell and the Triumph of Selective Contextualism,
2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35, 42–43.
74. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2484; id. at 2492 (“Congress wrote key parts of the Act
behind closed doors, rather than through the traditional legislative process. And Congress passed much of the Act using a complicated budgetary procedure known as
reconciliation, which limited opportunities for debate and amendment, and bypassed
the Senate’s normal 60-vote filibuster requirement. As a result, the Act does not
reflect the type of care and deliberation that one might expect of such significant
legislation.”) (citations omitted).
75. Adler & Cannon, supra note 73, at 125.
76. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2483 (“[H]ad Congress wished to assign that question to
an agency, it surely would have done so expressly. It is especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”) (citation omitted).
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mine whether millions of Americans were eligible for tax credits.77 It would
be one thing to conclude that Congress intended to delegate such power
where Congress carefully considered the relevant language and its implications. It would be quite another thing, however, to believe that Congress had
delegated authority without ever even hinting as much. The unusualness of a
delegation of such magnitude, combined with the way the ACA was enacted,
both counsel against presuming any such delegation would have been intended.
Chevron suggests that a statutory silence – a failure of Congress to address a particular question – may provide the sort of ambiguity that constitutes an implicit delegation of authority.78 Justice Stevens’s opinion speaks
of ambiguities that arise when a statute is “silent” on the relevant question.79
Whatever the merits of such an argument where Congress has enacted a statute through the usual process,80 it would seem to have no bearing when a
statute is not subject to the sort of internal deliberation in which a decision to
delegate authority to an agency would have been made. If we are to presume
that legislators draft statutes in light of Chevron and implicitly delegate interpretive authority in the process, this assumption should be grounded in assumptions about the regularity of the legislative process.
Where a statute is not simply ambiguous, or even silent, on a matter, but
“Janus-faced”81 or internally contradictory, there are additional reasons for
courts to pause before deferring. The Court faced such a statute in Scialabba
v. Cuellar de Osorio, in which the relevant statute was self-contradictory but
failed to recognize the implications of Chevron’s foundation for its application in such a case.82
At issue in Scialabba was a complex question of immigration law: how
to determine the priority date for visa applications of U.S. citizens’ family
members and lawful permanent residents who applied for visas as minors but
“age out” while waiting for their applications to be processed.83 The relevant
statutes, as amended by the Child Status Protection Act (“CSPA”), were anything but clear, at least as applied to some applicants. Indeed, as some of the
77. As came out in oral argument, one consequence of leaving this question to
the IRS would be that subsequent administrations could reverse this interpretation of
the relevant statutory provisions.
78. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984).
79. Id. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
80. For an argument that silences should not be considered such an ambiguity,
see Sales & Adler, supra note 60, at 1500–59.
81. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014) (plurality).
82. Id. at 2213.
83. Id. at 2201. As Justice Kagan wryly observed, only “hardy readers” could be
expected to wade through the Court’s opinion, let alone the relevant statutory provisions. Id. at 2203.

2016]

RESTORING CHEVRON’S DOMAN

997

Justices concluded, the relevant provision addressed one set of visa applicants
in “divergent ways.”84 The relevant statutory provisions seemed to conflict
with one another, forcing the Court to consider whether an intra-statutory
conflict would constitute (or create) the sort of ambiguity that could trigger
Chevron deference.85
On a theory of Chevron grounded in agency expertise and political accountability, the case for deference would be strong. Insofar as Chevron is
premised upon delegation, however, such a theory has problems. It is one
thing to say that a gap or ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation to fill in
the details but quite another to (in effect) conclude that when Congress has
enacted conflicting details, it delegated to the agency the power to choose
which detail should control. To so hold is to conclude that Congress has delegated to an agency the power to correct Congress’s mistakes.86
Writing for herself and two others, Justice Kagan had no problem concluding that Chevron should apply. In her telling, Scialabba was “the kind of
case Chevron was built for.”87 Given Kagan’s academic work grounding
Chevron in political accountability and Executive Branch policymaking, this
is not surprising.88 What may be surprising, however, is that her opinion
made no effort to reconcile its holding with Mead and effectively sidestepped the question of whether an intra-statutory conflict should really be
read as an implicit delegation of interpretive authority. The “selfcontradictory” nature of the provisions at issue rendered them ambiguous,
and, in Justice Kagan’s view, that was enough to trigger Chevron deference.89

84. Id. at 2203–04. Some of the Justices, however, believed the provisions that
appeared to be in conflict with one another could be reconciled, obviating the need to
defer to the agency. See, e.g., id. at 2214–15 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 2216
(Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2217 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
86. Cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1043–44 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (“Lest it ‘obtain a license to rewrite the statute,’ . . . we do not give an agency
alleging a scrivener’s error the benefit of Chevron step two deference, by which the
court credits any reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute. Rather, the agency
‘may deviate no further from the statute than is needed to protect congressional intent.’” (quoting Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir.
1998))).
87. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2213.
88. See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2373 (“As first conceived, the Chevron deference rule had its deepest roots in a conception of agencies as instruments of the President, entitled to make policy choices, within the gaps left by Congress, by virtue of
his relationship to the public.”); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 213.
89. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2203 (“[I]nternal tension makes possible alternative
reasonable constructions, bringing into correspondence in one way or another the
section’s different parts. And when that is so, Chevron dictates that a court defer to
the agency’s choice . . . .”).
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Chief Justice Roberts, while concurring in the result, refused to endorse
Justice Kagan’s Chevron revisionism.90 As he wrote for himself (and Justice
Scalia), he considered Justice Kagan’s “suggest[ion] that deference is warranted because of a direct conflict between [statutory] clauses . . . wrong.”91
As he explained, under Chevron, “courts defer to an agency’s reasonable
construction of an ambiguous statute because we presume that Congress intended to assign responsibility to resolve the ambiguity to the agency,” but no
such assumption can be made where Congress simultaneously enacts conflicting provisions.92 The Chief elaborated: “Direct conflict is not ambiguity, and
the resolution of such a conflict is not statutory construction but legislative
choice. Chevron is not a license for an agency to repair a statute that does not
make sense.”93
Justice Kagan only wrote for three members of the Court in Scialabba,
but the Court may soon be confronted with another case of an intra-statutory
conflict, albeit one of an even more unusual variety. Among the many questions raised in pending legal challenges to the Environmental Protection
Agency’s Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) is how to handle an apparent statutory
conflict created by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.94 When Congress revised the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in 1990, it enacted two separate
(and conflicting) revisions to the antecedent statutory provision.95 This is an
intra-statutory conflict, but it is also something more, for the question is not
merely what the statute means but what the statute is. As such, it should present an even more unlikely candidate for Chevron deference.
Here is some background. The CPP is an effort to control greenhouse
gas emissions from existing power plants, coal-fired power plants in particular, under § 111(d) of the CAA.96 Under this provision, the EPA identifies
the “best system of emission reduction” that has been “adequately demonstrated” for a given source category.97 This becomes the standard of performance that existing sources must meet. Pursuant to the CAA’s structure of
90. Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id. (“[W]hen Congress assigns to an agency the responsibility for deciding

whether a particular group should get relief, it does not do so by simultaneously saying that the group should and that it should not.”).
93. Id.
94. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830-01, 34853 (proposed June 18, 2014)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). See Environmental Law – Clean Air Act – EPA
Interprets the Clean Air Act to Allow Regulation of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from
Existing Power Plants. – The Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), 129 HARV. L. REV. 1152 (2016).
95. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830-01, 34853 (proposed June 18, 2014)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012).
97. Id. § 7411(a)(1).
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“cooperative federalism,” states are then expected to develop implementation
plans under which sources within each state will meet the emission targets.98
Should states refuse to develop implementation plans, the CAA empowers the
EPA to impose an implementation plan of its own in order to achieve the
same level of emission reductions.99
Whatever its legal merits, the CPP represents the most ambitious effort
to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions yet attempted. The plan’s goal
is to reduce power plant emissions by 32 percent (below 2005 levels) by
2030.100 This is significant because power plants are responsible for the lion’s share of greenhouse gas emissions.101 As such, whether the EPA has
statutory authority to impose and implement the CPP would seem to represent
the sort of major question for which Chevron deference is inappropriate.
Whether and how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to this degree is clearly
a matter of major economic and political significance, yet there is more.
Section 111(d) is not so much ambiguous as it is at war with itself. This
is because Congress enacted two separate revisions to § 111(d) in two separate parts of the CAA Amendments of 1990. The language currently in the
U.S. Code says the EPA cannot use § 111(d) to regulate air pollutants that are
“emitted from a source category” regulated under § 112.102 Because power
plants are currently subject to regulation under § 112, albeit for the purpose
of controlling other pollutants, this would suggest that the EPA lacks the au98. Id. § 7411(c).
99. Id. § 7411(d)(2).
100. Overview of the Clean Power Plan: Cutting Carbon Pollutants from Power

Plants, EPA 2, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-cppoverview.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
101. Learn
About Carbon Pollution from Power Plants, EPA,
http://epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/learn-about-carbon-pollution-power-plants (last updated July 27, 2016) (“Fossil fuel-fired power plants are the largest source of U.S. CO2
emissions.”). In 2016, however, transportation emissions rose above those from power plants. See Brad Plumer, Power Plants Are No Longer America’s Biggest Climate
Problem.
Transportation
Is.,
VOX
MEDIA,
http://www.vox.com/2016/6/13/11911798/emissions-electricity-versus-transportation
(last updated June 13, 2016, 11:10 AM).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (“The Administrator shall prescribe regulations
which shall establish a procedure similar to that provided by section 7410 of this title
under which each State shall submit to the Administrator a plan which (A) establishes
standards of performance for any existing source for any air pollutant (i) for which air
quality criteria have not been issued or which is not included on a list published under
section 7408(a) of this title or emitted from a source category which is regulated under section 7412 of this title but (ii) to which a standard of performance under this
section would apply if such existing source were a new source, and (B) provides for
the implementation and enforcement of such standards of performance. Regulations
of the Administrator under this paragraph shall permit the State in applying a standard
of performance to any particular source under a plan submitted under this paragraph
to take into consideration, among other factors, the remaining useful life of the existing source to which such standard applies.”).
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thority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from such sources under §
111(d).103 Yet it is not that simple, as the other amendment to § 111(d) would
seem to allow such regulation to proceed.
The potential statutory conflict in § 111(d) is particularly important because it implicates the EPA’s authority to enact the CPP in the first place.
The relevant language may be subject to alternative readings, upon which the
EPA’s legal position could be sustained (and the EPA argues as such). But
the EPA has also argued that, insofar as there is uncertainty as to how Congress amended the relevant statutory language – and therefore a degree of
uncertainty as to what the relevant statutory language is – the agency should
receive Chevron deference on this point.104
This argument for Chevron deference cannot be sustained on Chevron’s
delegation foundation. Congress erred in making simultaneous conflicting
amendments to the U.S. Code. An error is not an implicit delegation of authority, and there is no basis upon which to presume that Congress would
have intended it as such. Indeed, such a delegation would raise serious constitutional concerns – concerns far greater than those implicated by even the
broadest Chevron delegations.105 For Congress to delegate to the EPA the
authority to determine which amendment to the CAA is the law is for the
legislature to delegate to the executive the power to determine what is the
enacted law.106 If it is unconstitutional for Congress to delegate to the Executive Branch authority to excise unwanted portions of enacted legislation, it is
difficult to see how a delegation of authority to choose which provisions that
otherwise satisfied bicameralism and presentment are to be considered the
law.107 Thus, whatever else the Court concludes should it consider the CPP,
it should refrain from conferring Chevron deference to the EPA.

103. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7412.
104. Brief for Respondent EPA at 62, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330

(1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-1112, 14-1151, 14-1146), 2015 WL 661318, at *52 (“Where
internal tension in a statute makes possible alternative reasonable constructions,
Chevron dictates that a court defer to the agency’s . . . expert judgment about which
interpretation fits best with, and makes the most sense of, the statutory scheme.”
(quoting Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014) (plurality))).
105. See Sales & Adler, supra note 60, at 1539.
106. See Laurence H. Tribe & Peabody Energy Corp., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Issue Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units 27, 28 (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://www.masseygail.com/pdf/Tribe-Peabody_111(d)_Comments_(filed).pdf (“If
EPA were permitted to choose which of the two versions of Section 111 it preferred
to enforce, the agency would move beyond its proper role of ensuring that the law is
faithfully executed and instead assume lawmaking power . . . . [I]f Congress had indeed enacted two different versions of Section 111(d) in 1990, Chevron would confirm in EPA a wholly extra-constitutional latitude to choose between them.”).
107. Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998) (“There is no provision in
the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
Chevron is the law of the land and is likely to remain a key part of administrative law for years to come. Although some academics and politicians
seem ready to throw Chevron overboard, it is unlikely a majority of the Court
feels the same way. Accidental or not, Chevron deference will remain part of
the administrative law firmament.
Chevron may persist, but it should be constrained by its foundations. As
the Chief Justice suggested in City of Arlington, Chevron is not an excuse for
courts to abdicate their responsibilities. The doctrine does not give agencies
carte blanche. Rather, Chevron provides agencies with fulsome deference to
their statutory interpretations when agencies are acting pursuant to, and within the scope of, legislative delegation of authority. Chevron may rule, but it
should only do so within Chevron’s domain.
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